SFCRFT

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

Source Key

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- EX 66. TF (b)(1)1.4a CONSOLIDATED TIMELINE
  - EX 47. TF (b)(3),(b)(6) JOC LOG. 5-7 AUG 11
  – EX 67. <sub>I</sub>
                             GUN TAPE
                  (b)(3), (b)(6)
  - EX 68.
                             GUN TAPE
  - EX 59. TF (b)(1)1.4a JOC LOG.8 AUG 11
  - EX 69. WARNO (TF (6)(1)1.4a TM (6)(1)1.4a ) OBJ LEFTY GROVE (05AUG11)
  - EX 70. TF □ (b)(1)1.4a DUTY
  - EX 37. \Box (b)(3), (b)(6)
                        WORN STATEMENT (062200LAUG11)
9 - EX 38. (b)(3),(b)(6) SWORN STATEMENT (062200LAUG11)
10 - EX 57. HHC 10 CAB TOC LOG.122000ZAUG11
11 - EX 16. TM [[DI(1)].4a] CONOP BRIEF.OBJ LEFTY GROVE (051800ZAUG11)
12 - EX 71. OBJ LEFTY GROVE-EXTORTION 17 ISR LINE-UP
13 - EX 72. OBJ LEFTY GROVE SENSOR ALLOCATION V2 0
14 - EX 62. TF AND CSG POST INCIDENT THREAT VHF SUMMARY (7AUG11)
15 - EX 73. Pathfinders AAR
16 - EX 56. TE)(1)**1.44, (b)(1)**1.44OC LOG. 9 AUG 11
17 - EX 58. Timeline - 22 AUG 2011 email from JBAD Flight Lead
18 - EX 52. TF b)(1)1.4a LEFTY GROVE CONOP APPROVAL TIME 19 - EX 50. TF JOC LOG
20 - EX 74. CONOP Brief Time to (b)(1)1.4a CDR
21 - EX 75. PRED
22 - EX 76. MC-130H OPSUM Version 3.4
23 - EX 77. TF General Timeline(Macro)
24 - EX 48. TF (b)(1)1.4a CDR, SEA, J3 Interview
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NOTE: Separate agency documents refer to the CH-47 flight as and EXTORTION (b)(3),(b)(d) 7. For the sake of clarity, the CH47-D EXTORTION flight will be referred to as EXTORTION (b)(3),(b)(c)17 throughout this timeline.

NOTE: Minor discrepancies in reporting times exist across all exhibits; while acknowledging the differences, this timeline seeks to represent the most accurate version of events surrounding the 06 AUG 11 crash of EXTORTION 17.

5 AUG - Local Time (Zulu Time equals Local Time minus 4.5 hours)

1830	CH-47 aircrews arrive at company command post and
	proceed to preflight (1)
1856	(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4d geo-locates Objective LEFTY GROVE (23)
1930	Attack Weapons Team (AWT; AH-64)
	(b)(3).(b)(6)) arrive at company command post (1)

1930	TF Planner receives WARNO for an SP of 1800Z for OBJ LEFTY GROVE (8)
1944	WARNO: TF (b)(1)1.4a - TMb)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Objective LEFTY GROVE: TM
1944	
	CONDUCTS Helicopter Assault Force (HAF) RAID IOT
	C/K Objective LEFTY GROVE (QARI TAHIR); GRID IVO 42S
	VC 83431 62373; Sayyid Abad District, Wardak Province
1045	(2/6)
1945	(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4e) on
0100	station (O/S) Objective LEFTY GROVE (12)
2100	Combined AH/CH Air Mission Brief for Objective LEFTY
0100	GROVE (8)
2100	Objective LEFTY GROVE CONOP briefed to TF (b)(1)1.4a
0115	Commander (20)
2115	TM (1 st Platoon, Bravo Company, (b)(3),(b)(6),
	(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ; further noted as 1/B) briefs
	Objective LEFTY GROVE Operations Order (OPORD) (11)
2130	Objective LEFTY GROVE Concept of Operations (CONOP)
	submitted via SIPRNet from TF (b)(1)1.4a to TF(b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4c TM
	फाराप्या, and Joint Special Operations Aviation
	Detachment (JSOAD) (8)
2130	(12) O/S Objective LEFTY GROVE
2200	TF \bigcirc (b)(1)1.42 receives approval for Objective LEFTY
	GROVE initial insertion from CAB CDR. (8)
2218	(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c) Off-station from Objective LEFTY GROVE
	(12)
2230	P (6)(3), (6)(6) departs FOB (6)(1)1.4a for Objective LEFTY GROVE
	(3)
2240	EX (1)(7)(4a,(b)(1))(departs FOB (b)(1)1.4ak for Sayyid Abad with 46
	personnel and one Military Working Dog (MWD) to
	retrieve Battle Space Owner (BSO) liaison (3/19)
2240	(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4e O/S Objective LEFTY GROVE (3)
2245	(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c) O/S OBJ LEFTY GROVE (13)
2253	EX 17 depart Sayyid Abad for (b)(1)1.42
2254	EX 17 reports 6 minutes to infil (b)(1)1.4a (3)
2256	EX 17 reports 3 minutes to infil (b)(1)1.42 (3)
2258	EX 17 (b)(3), (b)(6) wheels down at(5)(1)1.4a(3)
2259	EX 17 infil complete (b)(1)1.4a (3)
2300	EX 17 depart \longrightarrow (b)(1)1.4a (3)
2308	EX 17 arrival FOB $_{(b)(1)1.42}$, assume casualty alert
	posture (19)
2323	1/B reports arrival at CP1 (19)
2327	While ground force conducts movement toward Objective
	area, positively identifies (PID) eight (8)
	insurgents with RPGs and AK-47s (3)

2328	1/B reports confirmation of (b)(3)(b)(6) sighting of eight
2320	(8) individuals with RPGs and weapons leaving the
	target area on the south side of the east road (19)
2330	(b)(3), (b)(6) reports insurgents maneuvering tactically in the
0220	tree line toward 1/B (3)
2332	
	insurgent position (2/3)
2338	engages insurgents with 30 mm (3)
2339	(FMV) and (FMV) and (FMV) and (FMV)
	insurgents fleeing engagement area moving west (3)
2344	(b)(3),(b)(6) passes assessment of 5 enemy killed in action
	from previous engagement (EKIA) (3)
2345	The TF (b)(1)14t commander at the recommendation of the
	T (b)(3),(b)(6) considers using the
	immediate reaction force (IRF) to interdict insurgents
2346	fleeing Objective LEFTY GROVE to the northwest. (EX 1)
2340	position (3)
2351	குருக்கு completes re-attack with 30 mm on the original
	insurgent position (3)
2352	1/B at Objective Rally Point (ORP) (19)
6 AUG	
6 AUG	
6 AUG	
	1/B reports primary target buildings isolated (19) 1/B reports commencing callout on primary target
0008	1/B reports primary target buildings isolated (19)
0008	1/B reports primary target buildings isolated (19) 1/B reports commencing callout on primary target buildings. (19) 1/B dispatches element to interdict two insurgents
0008 0012 0012	1/B reports primary target buildings isolated (19) 1/B reports commencing callout on primary target buildings. (19) 1/B dispatches element to interdict two insurgents fleeing engagement area (19)
0008 0012	1/B reports primary target buildings isolated (19) 1/B reports commencing callout on primary target buildings. (19) 1/B dispatches element to interdict two insurgents fleeing engagement area (19) 1/B element conducts battle damage assessment of AWT
0008 0012 0012 0029	1/B reports primary target buildings isolated (19) 1/B reports commencing callout on primary target buildings. (19) 1/B dispatches element to interdict two insurgents fleeing engagement area (19) 1/B element conducts battle damage assessment of AWT engagement, reports one additional EKIA (19)
0008 0012 0012	1/B reports primary target buildings isolated (19) 1/B reports commencing callout on primary target buildings. (19) 1/B dispatches element to interdict two insurgents fleeing engagement area (19) 1/B element conducts battle damage assessment of AWT engagement, reports one additional EKIA (19) TF 60(1)14\$ J3 issues WARNO to IRF to interdict insurgents
0008 0012 0012 0029	1/B reports primary target buildings isolated (19) 1/B reports commencing callout on primary target buildings. (19) 1/B dispatches element to interdict two insurgents fleeing engagement area (19) 1/B element conducts battle damage assessment of AWT engagement, reports one additional EKIA (19) TF AMOUNT J3 issues WARNO to IRF to interdict insurgents that fled approximately two kilometers from Objective
0008 0012 0012 0029	1/B reports primary target buildings isolated (19) 1/B reports commencing callout on primary target buildings. (19) 1/B dispatches element to interdict two insurgents fleeing engagement area (19) 1/B element conducts battle damage assessment of AWT engagement, reports one additional EKIA (19) TF (19) TF (19) Issues WARNO to IRF to interdict insurgents that fled approximately two kilometers from Objective LEFTY GROVE (11)
0008 0012 0012 0029 0030	1/B reports primary target buildings isolated (19) 1/B reports commencing callout on primary target buildings. (19) 1/B dispatches element to interdict two insurgents fleeing engagement area (19) 1/B element conducts battle damage assessment of AWT engagement, reports one additional EKIA (19) TF AMOUNT J3 issues WARNO to IRF to interdict insurgents that fled approximately two kilometers from Objective
0008 0012 0012 0029 0030	1/B reports primary target buildings isolated (19) 1/B reports commencing callout on primary target buildings. (19) 1/B dispatches element to interdict two insurgents fleeing engagement area (19) 1/B element conducts battle damage assessment of AWT engagement, reports one additional EKIA (19) TF (19) 1/4 J3 issues WARNO to IRF to interdict insurgents that fled approximately two kilometers from Objective LEFTY GROVE (11) (5)(1)1.4a.(5)(1)1.4c UAV O/S Objective LEFTY GROVE (12)
0008 0012 0012 0029 0030	1/B reports primary target buildings isolated (19) 1/B reports commencing callout on primary target buildings. (19) 1/B dispatches element to interdict two insurgents fleeing engagement area (19) 1/B element conducts battle damage assessment of AWT engagement, reports one additional EKIA (19) TF conta J3 issues WARNO to IRF to interdict insurgents that fled approximately two kilometers from Objective LEFTY GROVE (11)
0008 0012 0012 0029 0030 0030 0049	1/B reports primary target buildings isolated (19) 1/B reports commencing callout on primary target buildings. (19) 1/B dispatches element to interdict two insurgents fleeing engagement area (19) 1/B element conducts battle damage assessment of AWT engagement, reports one additional EKIA (19) TF build J3 issues WARNO to IRF to interdict insurgents that fled approximately two kilometers from Objective LEFTY GROVE (11) WHO DESCRIPTION OF TARGET OF THE PROVE (12) 1/B reports isolation set on northern target buildings. Tactical Questioning (TQ) and Sensitive Sight Exploitation (SSE) are ongoing in primary target buildings. (19)
0008 0012 0012 0029 0030	1/B reports primary target buildings isolated (19) 1/B reports commencing callout on primary target buildings. (19) 1/B dispatches element to interdict two insurgents fleeing engagement area (19) 1/B element conducts battle damage assessment of AWT engagement, reports one additional EKIA (19) TF (19)
0008 0012 0012 0029 0030 0030 0049	1/B reports primary target buildings isolated (19) 1/B reports commencing callout on primary target buildings. (19) 1/B dispatches element to interdict two insurgents fleeing engagement area (19) 1/B element conducts battle damage assessment of AWT engagement, reports one additional EKIA (19) TF DAMAGE J3 issues WARNO to IRF to interdict insurgents that fled approximately two kilometers from Objective LEFTY GROVE (11) DESCRIPTION OF TARGET UAV O/S Objective LEFTY GROVE (12) 1/B reports isolation set on northern target buildings. Tactical Questioning (TQ) and Sensitive Sight Exploitation (SSE) are ongoing in primary target buildings. (19) 1/B interdiction element estimates total of six (6) EKIA from AWT engagement. (19)
0008 0012 0012 0029 0030 0030 0049	1/B reports primary target buildings isolated (19) 1/B reports commencing callout on primary target buildings. (19) 1/B dispatches element to interdict two insurgents fleeing engagement area (19) 1/B element conducts battle damage assessment of AWT engagement, reports one additional EKIA (19) TF (19)

0135	TF 🖼 commander approves IRF insertion to HLZ
	\bigcirc , and increases force size from 17 to 32 (18)
0135	TF $\frac{(b)(1)1.4a}{}$ Planner updates TF $\frac{(b)(1)1.4a}{}$ Battle Captain
	of TF (%)(1)1.4a intention to insert IRF (9)
0140	TF $\frac{(b)(1)1.4a}{(b)(3)/1.4a}$ Planner notifies EX $\frac{(b)(3)}{(b)(3)}$ 17 by FM radio of
	IRF mission (4)
0140	informs that suspected insurgents who
	fled the target area are now in a compound
	approximately 2.8km to the northwest of Objective
	Lefty Grove.
0140	TF (b)(3),(b)(6) Assistant S3 delivers hard copy of HLZ
	imagery to EX 17 only (8)
0145	TF (b)(3), (b)(6) Planner contacted by 10 th Combat Aviation
	Brigade (CAB) Commander () to discuss HLZ
	(b)(3)(b)(6) nd verifies the Ground Tactical Plan (8)
0148	EX 17 (DIS) assume REDCON level 1 (19)
0150	TF K (b)(3), (b)(6) CDR (KH6) and the 10^{th} CAB CDR (F6)
	discuss suitability of HLZ Gogg, Green; HLZ Gogg, Greens approved
	by F6 (8)
0150	TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c Planner receives notification by TF
	K (b)(3), (b)(6) — CDR that HLZ — (b)(3) — IRF infil is approved
0200	(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c mmander directs TF (b)(3), (b)(6) Planner to
	infil IRF as soon as possible with a minimum force of
	32 instead of 17 (8)
0200	$\phantom{aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa$
	EXTORTION 17 (b)(3) move to staging area and pick up 32
	IRF personnel. (9)
0200	(U-28) off-station from Objective LEFTY GROVE
	(12)
0200	(B-350) O/S Objective LEFTY ROVE (12)
0205	
	to determine if they are capable of infiltrating an
	IRF of 32, plus one MWD. (8)
0205	EXTORTION 17/(EXC) confirms via FM radio they are capable
	of inserting 32 personnel via single ship (8)
0206	1/B reports primary target buildings clear and secure,
	begins sensitive sight exploitation (SSE) of AWT
	engagement. SSE yields: 6 x EKIA, 2 x AK-47, 1 x RPG,
	6 x fragmentation grenades, 2 x ICOM radios, 6 x SCION
	handsets(19)
0209	EXTORTION 17 [big] reports to (big) (big) TOC via FM radio
	that the IRF is composed of 33 IRF personnel, plus one
	MWD and they are at REDCON level 1, awaiting AWT to
	refuel (19)
0214	AWT depart FOB (b)(3), (b)(6) for HLZ (b)(3), (b)(6) (4)

0222	EXTORTION 17 (b)(3) departs FOB (b)(1)1.42 for infil of IRF at HLZ (b)(3), (b)(6)(8) 1/19)
0224	EXTORTION (S) established in holding pattern north of HLZ (S) (2/4)
0225	EXTORTION 17 reports 6 minutes out from HLZ (b)(3),(b)(6) (2/4)
0232	EXTORTION 17 reports '4 minutes out' from HLZ (b)(3),(b)(6) (4)
0233	(b)(3),(b)(6) establishes orbit in vicinity of (IVO) HLZ (b)(3),(b)(6) (3)
0233	where the insurgents fled (4)
0233	EXTORTION 17 reports 3 minutes out from HLZ (b)(3),(b)(6) (4) (b)(3),(b)(6) notifies EXTORTION 17 (b)(3) (d)(6) determines HLZ (b)(3),(b)(6) to have no enemy activity ("ICE") (4)
0236:47	EXTORTION 17 requests (AC-130) illuminate ("sparkle") HLZ ((b)(3), (b)(6) with Infrared (IR) designator (4)
0236:58	(AC-130) notifies EXTORTION 17 that HLZ is illuminated with IR designator ("burn is on") (4)
0237:03	EXTORTION 17 reports IR designator on HLZ (6)(3) s in sight ("Burn in Sight") (4)
0238:36	EXTORTION 17 reports "One Minute, one minute" out from HLZ (5)(3),(5)(6) (4)
0238:47	acknowledges EXTORTION 17's one minute out call and informs EXTORTION 17 the HLZ is still illuminated with the Infrared (IR) designator: "Copy, 1 minute. Burn is still on" (4)
0238:59	reconfirms to EXTORTION 17 that there is no enemy activity noted on HLZ (b)(3) (b)(6): "LZ is still Ice" (4)
0239:15	Positively identifies EXTORTION 17 inbound for HLZ முது முற (3)
0239:22	Prop. 600 passes HLZ conditions, EXTORTION 17 acknowledges (4)
0239:48	By there's an explosion, there's another explosion." Further states: "Extortion is down." (3/4)
0240:17	makes "Fallen Angel" NET call to all elements in the Objective area indicating EXTORTION 17 has been shot down(4)
0240:18	suppresses suspected enemy positions IVO the suspected point of origin (POO)(3)
0240:18 0240:36	establishes security orbit over crash site (3) notifies $(b)(3), (b)(6)$ TOC that EXTORTION 17 has been shot down (4)

0242:59	P)(3), (b)(6) relays to \square (b)(3), (b)(6) (AC-130) suspected POO of
	RPG attack (3)
0243	((b)(3),(b)(6) TOC initiates downed aircraft procedures
	(7)
0243	TF (b)(3),(b)(6) element notified of downed
	aircraft (15)
0245	PB reports secondary explosions at crash site (1)
0245	TF duty log reports crash site IVO
	(b)(3) (2/7)
0245	10 th CAB Duty Officer notifies Division of downed
0213	aircraft (10)
0248	EXTORTION (10) remains in a holding pattern 3 miles from
0210	crash site (1/7)
0250	1/B reports they are leaving all detainees on
0230	Objective LEFTY GROVE and moving to crash site ASAP
	(19)
0252	Additional AWT at FOB ADMINIAL assumes REDCON level 2 (1)
0252	EXTORTION (5)(3) arrives at (5)(1)1.4a, (5)(1)1.4c (1)
0254	10 th CAB Fire Support Officer (FSO) reports (b)(3),(b)(6)
0231	(B1-B) nine (9) minutes away from crash site (10)
0255	10 th CAB intelligence section reports (MQ-1) UAV
0233	O/S over crash site (10)
0256	(AC-130) assumes role as On-Scene Commander
0230	(4)
0304	10 th CAB FSO reports (b)(3),(b)(6) O/S at the EXTORTION 17
0304	crash site (10)
0305	(10) assumes REDCON level 1 (7)
0315	$\begin{array}{c} \text{(b)(3), (b)(6)} \\ \text{(MC-12)} \text{ O/S IVO crash site (12)} \\ \end{array}$
0315	$\begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} \begin{array}{c} $
0315	(b)(3),(b)(6) (EC-130) O/S IVO Clash site (13)
0315	(b)(3), (b)(6) (MH-47) departs FOB (b)(3), (b)(6) en-route to
0317	
	FOB $(b)(3), (b)(6)$ to pick up 3^{rd} Platoon, $(b)(3), (b)(6)$ Company, $(b)(3), (b)(6)$ further annotated as
0319:18	3/D) en-route to FOB (b)(1)1.4a (19) (b)(3),(b)(6) observes secondary explosions IVO crash site (3)
0319:47	identifies two possible survivors, passes information to 10 th CAB (21) **Refuted after viewing ^(b) (B).(b)(6)
	gun tapes and crew statements; coroner finds injuries
0221	invalidate the initial report**
0321	AWT conducting containment fire (7)
0327:43	thing thing (3) the first size (
	for first time (3) **Refuted after viewingb(s),(8),(8)(6)(6)
	tapes and crew statements; coroner finds injuries
	invalidate the initial report**

0328	$10^{ m th}$ CAB fire support element reports $lacksquare$ (2 x A-
	10) 20 minutes out from crash site (10)
0330	(EA-6B) off-station from crash site (13)
0330	(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c reports insurgents IVO
	(b)(6) (b)(7)c claim responsibility for downing of a
	alition aircraft (14)
0240	
0340	(b)(1)1.4a.(b)(1)indicates insurgents claiming credit for firing two
	rounds at the 'target' (CF aircraft)(14)
0345	$_{(b)(3),(b)(6)}$ (2 x A-10) O/S over Crash site (13)
0347	(b)(1)14a,(b)(1)f.eports insurgents have identified that coalition
	elements had entered a field, surveyed the aircraft,
	and then headed back to an unspecified road (14)
0350	TF (b)(1)1.40 approves launch of the (b)(3),(b)(6) element to
	crash site (10)
0359	िकार प्राप्त का (20 pax) depart FOB का विभाग के en-route
0333	crash site on GALLANT $40/44$ (2 x UH-60) (7/10)
0400	\longrightarrow (MQ-1) O/S over crash site (12)
0401	B reports 150m from crash site (1/7)
0405	(b)(1)1. (a. (b)(1
	$(\overline{\text{\tiny (b)(6), (b)(7)c}})$ informed $_{\text{\tiny (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.14c}}$ that three weapons were set
	in the area; one round hit the aircraft fired from a
	gun in the middle. Unidentified insurgents $(6,6)$, (6) , (6) , (6) , (7) , (6) , (7) , (6) , (7) , (6) , (7) , (6) , (7) , (6) , (7) , (6) , (7) , (6) , (7) , (6) , (7) , (6) , (7) , (6) , (7) , (6) , (7) , (6) , (7) , (6) , (7) , (6) , (7) , (6) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) , (7) ,
	and (b)(c),(b)(7)In had fired at the aircraft, but only (b)(6),(b)(7)c
	had hit the aircraft (14)
0405	TF — (b)(3), (b)(6) — reports there is one friendly spotted
	10-15 meters o tside of crash site (10) **Refuted
	after viewing Gun tapes and crew statements;
	coroner finds injuries invalidate the initial report**
0407	TF (b)(3),(b)(6) k reports one coalition service member
0107	recovered from Crash site by (10) **Refuted
	after viewingb/3-160/6gun tapes and crew statements**
0.4.0.0	
0409	(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)iadicates insurgents were preparing to further
	engage coalition forces, asking that a watchman be
	instructed to fire a few rounds presumably aimed at
	the coalition forces in the area (14)
0414	🏎 🗀 initiates suppressive fires IVO Pathfinder HLZ
	(10)
0415	(b)(3),(b)(6) with Pathfinder element lands in HLZ
	approximately $600m$ southeast of crash site. $(1/4/7)$
0415	(a)(3),(b)(c) reports visual contact of Pathfinder element,
0 0	but has not established radio communications (7)
0415	= element with 3/D arrives at FOB $=$ (19)
0415	
OTIO	that incurrents plan to fire on Coalition Forces
	that insurgents plan to fire on Coalition Forces
	around the crash site (10)

0419	1/B reports crash site secured, reports six friendly KIA (FKIA). Secondary explosions forces 1/B to back-off crash site (1/19)
0424	(1/13), (b)(3), (b)(6) arrive FOB (b)(3), (b)(3), (b)(3)
0424	Pathfinder element reports 400m from crash site (1)
	-
0433	Relief AWT (PB 66/47) reports departure from FOB $_{(b)(1)1.4a}$ (8/10)
0433	TOC reports the Pathfinder element is in communication with 1/B and is being over-watched by(b)(B)(B)(b)(5)(5)(5)(6)(10)
0434	remains REDCON level 1. (7)
0440	TOC reports $(b)(3), (b)(6)$ TOC reports $(b)(3), (b)(6)$ O/S over crash site
0441	(10) 10 th CAB updates 10 th Mountain Division via Tandberg. (10)
0446	10^{th} CAB Battle NCO reports (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c,(b)(1)1.4e is complete. (10)
0455	AWT spotted six possible insurgents on top of a roof of a qalat; attempted to gain positive identification (PID) of weapons. (10)
0457	TF (MA) reports 1/B completed link up with Pathfinder element. (2)
0459	Pathfinder requests water (CL1) resupply. (7)
0502	TF (b)(3) (b)(6) k reports 67 total personnel on EX 17
	crash site. (10)
0505	TF
0506	TF $\frac{60(3),60(6)}{}$ reports a total of 87 personnel on crash site. (10)
0515	TF was the reports resupply speedballs are loaded with water and ammunition; will deliver when able (10)
0520	riangle depart FOB கூருக்க en-route to crash site to
0520	take back over site security. (1) 10 th CAB intelligence section reports that (MC- 12) is reporting a group of PAX 300m from the crash site; security element firing warning shots. (10)
0525	1/B reports a perimeter of 150-200M is established around Crash site; no requirements for additional ground forces. (2)
0530	(MC-12) and $(B-350)$ O/S over crash site. (12)
0534	Pathfinder element requests body bags and resupply (7)
0546	monitoring. (7)

0553	Pathfinder element report on top of food/water and body bags. Need 12 radio batteries. (7)
0610	K TOC reports C130 airdrop will be performed
0620	between $0345z$ and $0430z$. (7) (B-350) off-station of crash site. (12)
0623	1/B reports 12 FKIA identified. (2)
0641	TF (b)(a), (b)(c) reports ground force requesting 12 fire
0011	extinguishers. (2)
0700	Pathfinder report 33 of 38 FKIA recovered. (7)
0714	□(b)(3),(b)(6)□ off-station from crash site; battle handover
	completed with (b)(3),(b)(6).
0720	(7) (b)(3) (b)(6) rrives at FOB (b)(1)1.4a . (7)
0730	\bigcirc (MC-12) off-station of crash site. (12)
0733	\longrightarrow (b)(3), (b)(6) departs FOB (b)(1)1.42 to conduct resupply.
	(7)
0758	(7) arrives at FOB (b)(1)14a.
0908	TF (b)(3),(b)(6) JOC reports C-130 air resupply complete. (2/7)
0930	(MC-12), $(B-350)$ O/S crash site.
0930	(MC-12) and $(B-350)$ off-station of
	crash site. (14)
1012	TF (b)(3),(b)(6) reports BSO element (TF (b)(3),(b)(6)) conducting
	ground m ment to crash site. (2)
1035	10 th CAB) (intercept reports insurgents are planning
1000	to attack crash site. (10)
1038	TF reports recovery by 1/B of all 38 FKIA. (19)
1038	TF (b)(3), (b)(d) reports TF (b)(3), (b)(6) r continuing movement toward crash site, multiple improvised explosives devices (IED) have been cleared en-route to crash site. (19)
1122	TF reports BSO 500m from crash site. (2) TF reports second C-130 air resupply complete.
1122	TF $\frac{p(0,0)}{r}$ reports second C-130 air resupply complete. (2/10)
1156	TF (b)(3), (b)(6) has linked up with 1/B.
1330	
1000	O/S Crash site. (12)
1330	(B-350) of $(B-350)$ of $(B-350)$ of $(B-350)$
1247	crash site. (12)
1347	Pathfinder reports all FKIA are loaded onto TF (b)(3),(b)(6)
1515	vehicles for transport to Sayyid Abad. (10) (b)(3),(b)(6) R (MQ-9) off-station of crash site. (12)
1515	10 th Mountain Division Chief of Current Operations
TOTO	confirmed FKIA will be transferred by ground to Sayyid
	Abad and MH47 aircraft will transfer them to FOB

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

	(b)(1)14a, then will travel via fixed wing aircraft to
	Bagram Airfield. (10)
1627	TF (19) r departs crash site with FKIA en route to Sayyid Abad. (19)
1730	(MC-12) and $(B-350)$ off-station
1730	Crash site. (12) $\frac{\text{(b)(3), (b)(6)}}{\text{(MC-12)}} \text{ (MC-12)} \text{ and } \frac{\text{(b)(3), (b)(6)}}{\text{(B-350)}} \text{ (B-350)} \text{ O/S crash}$
	site. (12)
2114	1/B reports flash flood is washing away portions of
0120	the aircraft wreckage. (19)
2130	(U-28) O/S crash site.
2130	F (b)(3), (b)(6) (MC-12) and (b)(3), (b)(6) (B-350) off-station crash site. (12)
2234	(MH ir Mission Commander [AMC]) reports departure FOB (6)(1)142 for Sayyid Abad for repatriation of FKIA. (17/19)
2249	T (b)(3),(b)(6) 3 reports arrival at Sayyid Abad. (17/19)
2308	— (b)(3),(b)(6) 3 reports departure Sayyid Abad with FKIA.
	(17/19)
2321	$\frac{\text{(b)(3), (b)(6)}}{\text{(b)}}$ reports arrival at FOB $\frac{\text{(b)}(1)1.44}{\text{(b)}}$. (17)
2350	MC-130 loads first lift of 19 human remains from FOB
	фильма к. (22)
7 AUG 201	
7 AUG 201	TF (bi3).(b)(6) reports 3/D departs FOB (b)(1)1.4a to conduct link-
0106	TF (bi3), (b)(d) reports 3/D departs FOB (b)(1)1.4a to conduct link-up with 1/B. (19)
	TF (bi3) (b)(6) reports 3/D departs FOB (b)(1)1.4a to conduct link-up with 1/B. (19) (b)(3) (b)(6) reports three MH-47s are en-route to crash site to conduct relief in place between 1/B and Team
0106 0107	TF (bi3) (b)(d) reports 3/D departs FOB (b)(1)1.4a to conduct link-up with 1/B. (19) (b)(3),(b)(6) reports three MH-47s are en-route to crash site to conduct relief in place between 1/B and Team 3/D. (17)
0106 0107 0119	TF (bi3), (b)(d) reports 3/D departs FOB (b)(1)1.4a to conduct link-up with 1/B. (19) (b)(3), (b)(6) reports three MH-47s are en-route to crash site to conduct relief in place between 1/B and Team 3/D. (17) (b)(3), (b)(6) infil of 54 3/D personnel complete. (17/19)
0106 0107	TF (b(3), (b)(6) reports 3/D departs FOB (b)(1)1.4a to conduct link-up with 1/B. (19) (b)(3), (b)(6) reports three MH-47s are en-route to crash site to conduct relief in place between 1/B and Team 3/D. (17) (b)(3), (b)(6) infil of 54 3/D personnel complete. (17/19) F (b)(3), (b)(6) (MC-12) and (b)(3), (b)(6) (B-350) O/S of crash
0106 0107 0119 0130	TF (b(3), (b)(6) reports 3/D departs FOB (b)(1)1.4a to conduct link-up with 1/B. (19) (b)(3), (b)(6) reports three MH-47s are en-route to crash site to conduct relief in place between 1/B and Team 3/D. (17) (b)(3), (b)(6) infil of 54 3/D personnel complete. (17/19) F (b)(3), (b)(6) (MC-12) and (b)(3), (b)(6) (B-350) O/S of crash site. (12)
0106 0107 0119	TF (b)(3), (b)(6) reports 3/D departs FOB (b)(1)1.4a to conduct link-up with 1/B. (19) (b)(3), (b)(6) reports three MH-47s are en-route to crash site to conduct relief in place between 1/B and Team 3/D. (17) (b)(3), (b)(6) infil of 54 3/D personnel complete. (17/19) F (b)(3), (b)(6) (MC-12) and (b)(3), (b)(6) (B-350) O/S of crash site. (12) F (b)(3), (b)(6) (MC-12) and (b)(3), (b)(6) (U-28) off-station
0106 0107 0119 0130 0130	TF (b(3), (b)(6) reports 3/D departs FOB (b)(1)1.4a to conduct link-up with 1/B. (19) (b)(3), (b)(6) reports three MH-47s are en-route to crash site to conduct relief in place between 1/B and Team 3/D. (17) (b)(3), (b)(6) infil of 54 3/D personnel complete. (17/19) F (b)(3), (b)(6) (MC-12) and (b)(3), (b)(6) (B-350) O/S of crash site. (12) F (b)(3), (b)(6) (MC-12) and (b)(3), (b)(6) (U-28) off-station from crash site. (12)
0106 0107 0119 0130	TF (b)(3), (b)(6) reports 3/D departs FOB (b)(1)1.4a to conduct link-up with 1/B. (19) (b)(3), (b)(6) reports three MH-47s are en-route to crash site to conduct relief in place between 1/B and Team 3/D. (17) (b)(3), (b)(6) infil of 54 3/D personnel complete. (17/19) F (b)(3), (b)(6) (MC-12) and (b)(3), (b)(6) (B-350) O/S of crash site. (12) F (b)(3), (b)(6) (MC-12) and (b)(3), (b)(6) (U-28) off-station
0106 0107 0119 0130 0130	TF (b)(3).(b)(6) reports 3/D departs FOB (b)(1)1.4a to conduct link-up with 1/B. (19) (b)(3).(b)(6) reports three MH-47s are en-route to crash site to conduct relief in place between 1/B and Team 3/D. (17) (b)(3).(b)(6) infil of 54 3/D personnel complete. (17/19) F (b)(3).(b)(6) (MC-12) and (b)(3).(b)(6) (B-350) O/S of crash site. (12) F (b)(3).(b)(6) (MC-12) and (b)(3).(b)(6) (U-28) off-station from crash site. (12) T (b)(3).(b)(6) reports arrival at FOB (b)(1)1.4a and REDCON
0106 0107 0119 0130 0130	TF (b(3),(b)(6) reports 3/D departs FOB (b)(1)1.4a to conduct link- up with 1/B. (19) (b)(3),(b)(6) reports three MH-47s are en-route to crash site to conduct relief in place between 1/B and Team 3/D. (17) (b)(3),(b)(6) infil of 54 3/D personnel complete. (17/19) F (b)(3),(b)(6) (MC-12) and (b)(3),(b)(6) (B-350) O/S of crash site. (12) F (b)(3),(b)(6) (MC-12) and (b)(3),(b)(6) (U-28) off-station from crash site. (12) T (b)(3),(b)(6) reports arrival at FOB (b)(1)1.4a and REDCON level 2. (17)
0106 0107 0119 0130 0130 0130 0200 0213	TF (b(3),(b)(6) reports 3/D departs FOB (b)(1)1.4a to conduct link-up with 1/B. (19) (b)(3),(b)(6) reports three MH-47s are en-route to crash site to conduct relief in place between 1/B and Team 3/D. (17) (b)(3),(b)(6) infil of 54 3/D personnel complete. (17/19) (b)(3),(b)(6) (MC-12) and (b)(3),(b)(6) (B-350) O/S of crash site. (12) (MC-12) and (b)(3),(b)(6) (U-28) off-station from crash site. (12) (MC-12) and (b)(3),(b)(6) (U-28) off-station from crash site. (12) (MC-12) and (b)(3),(b)(6) (U-28) off-station from crash site. (12) (MC-12) and (b)(3),(b)(6) (U-28) off-station from crash site. (12) (MC-12) and (b)(3),(b)(6) (U-28) off-station from crash site. (12) (MC-12) and (b)(3),(b)(6) (U-28) off-station from crash site. (12)
0106 0107 0119 0130 0130 0130	TF (b(3),(b)(6) reports 3/D departs FOB (b)(1)1.4a to conduct link- up with 1/B. (19) (b(3),(b)(6) reports three MH-47s are en-route to crash site to conduct relief in place between 1/B and Team 3/D. (17) (b(3),(b)(6) infil of 54 3/D personnel complete. (17/19) (MC-12) and (b)(3),(b)(6) (B-350) O/S of crash site. (12) (MC-12) and (b)(3),(b)(6) (U-28) off-station from crash site. (12) (MC-12) and (b)(3),(b)(6) (U-28) off-station from crash site. (12) (MC-12) and (b)(3),(b)(6) (U-28) off-station from crash site. (12) (MC-9) O/S crash site. (12)
0106 0107 0119 0130 0130 0130 0200 0213	TF (b)(3),(b)(6) reports 3/D departs FOB (b)(1)1.4a to conduct link- up with 1/B. (19) (b)(3),(b)(6) reports three MH-47s are en-route to crash site to conduct relief in place between 1/B and Team 3/D. (17) (b)(3),(b)(6) infil of 54 3/D personnel complete. (17/19) (b)(3),(b)(6) infil of 54 3/D personnel complete. (17/19) (b)(3),(b)(6) (MC-12) and (b)(3),(b)(6) (B-350) O/S of crash site. (12) (MC-12) and (b)(3),(b)(6) (U-28) off-station from crash site. (12) (MC-12) and (b)(3),(b)(6) (U-28) off-station from crash site. (12) (MC-12) and (b)(3),(b)(6) (U-28) off-station from crash site. (12) (MC-12) and (b)(3),(b)(6) (U-28) off-station from crash site. (12) (MC-12) and (b)(3),(b)(6) (U-28) off-station from crash site. (12) (MC-12) and (b)(3),(b)(6) (U-28) off-station from crash site. (12) (MC-12) and (b)(3),(b)(6) (U-28) off-station from crash site. (12) (MC-12) and (b)(3),(b)(6) (U-28) off-station from crash site. (12) (MC-12) and (b)(3),(b)(6) (U-28) off-station from crash site. (12) (MC-12) and (b)(3),(b)(6) (U-28) off-station from crash site. (12) (MC-12) and (b)(3),(b)(6) (U-28) off-station from crash site. (12) (MC-12) and (b)(3),(b)(6) (U-28) off-station from crash site. (12) (MC-12) and (b)(3),(b)(6) (U-28) off-station from crash site. (12) (MC-12) and (b)(3),(b)(6) (U-28) off-station from crash site. (12) (MC-12) and (b)(3),(b)(6) (U-28) off-station from crash site. (12) (MC-12) and (b)(3),(b)(6) (U-28) off-station from crash site. (12)
0106 0107 0119 0130 0130 0130 0200 0213	TF (b(3),(b)(6) reports 3/D departs FOB (b)(1)1.4a to conduct link- up with 1/B. (19) (b(3),(b)(6) reports three MH-47s are en-route to crash site to conduct relief in place between 1/B and Team 3/D. (17) (b(3),(b)(6) infil of 54 3/D personnel complete. (17/19) (MC-12) and (b)(3),(b)(6) (B-350) O/S of crash site. (12) (MC-12) and (b)(3),(b)(6) (U-28) off-station from crash site. (12) (MC-12) and (b)(3),(b)(6) (U-28) off-station from crash site. (12) (MC-12) and (b)(3),(b)(6) (U-28) off-station from crash site. (12) (MC-9) O/S crash site. (12)

SECRET

0300	(b)(3), (b)(6) Q-1) O/S crash site. (12)
0301	(b)(3), (b)(6) TOC reports (b)(3), (b)(6) departs FOB (b)(1)1.4a
	on resupply mission. (10)
0320	MC-130 delivers first lift of 19 human remains to BAF.
0320	(22
0224	
0324	TF big. big reports relief-in-place complete between 1/B
0.4.0.0	and 3/D; 1/B moving to exfil HLZ. (19)
0422	(b)(3) (AMC) departs FOB $(b)(3),(b)(6)$ to pick up $1/B$.
	(17/19)
0433	reports exfil complete of $1/B$. (17/19)
0435	C-130 loads second lift of 19 FKIA remains from FOB
(b)(1)1.44.1937.6分6)。 (22)
0453	(b)(3) reports arrival at FOB $(b)(1)1.42$ with $1/B$. (19)
0550	MC-130 delivers second lift of 19 human remains to
	BAF. (22)
0719	TF reports two air resupply drops complete. (2)
0832	TF reports two air resupply drops complete. (2) TF reports 3/D pushing out small element to link-
0032	up with BSO. (2)
0929	TF (b)(3), (b)(6) reports BSO Commander (TF (b)(3), (b)(6) Commander)
0020	link-up complete, conducted walk-through of crash
1 (1 1	site. (2)
1611	TF (b)(3),(b)(6) reports EOD conducts several detonations,
	reducing wreckage to effect transport. (19)
2034	10^{th} CAB reports (b)(1)1.4a,(b)(1)1.4c,(b)(1)1.4e lifted. (10)
00	
08 AUG 20	<u>)11</u>
1006	
1206	TF (b)(3), (b)(6) assumes responsibility for
	crash site security
1239	Security element discovers IED outside of compound
	near crash site. (19)
1438	Crash sites A, D, and E is 100% cleared. The welders
	have moved to sites B and C. (19)
1832	(17)
1930	(b)(3),(b)(6) reports exfil of 20 Pathfinders and a
	portion of 3/D from the vicinity of the crash site.
	(17)
2010	(b)(3),(b)(6) reports exfil remainder of 3/D off of crash
2010	site. (17)
2311	TF
2711	11 (b)(3), (b)(6) 1 epoilob all frin departed bar for dermany. (3)
9 AUG 201	11
<u> </u>	
0655	TF (b)(3),(b)(6) reports all FKIA arrived in Germany. (16)
3000	Topolos all little allivea in collicity. (10)